possible future membership in Al Qaeda. 8 The tenor of the charges poses significant tensions with a core holding of modem First Amendment law that mere membership-let alone applying for the opportunity to seek membership at some future date--cannot be a basis for criminal prosecution. 9 Moreover, the amorphous intent connoted by a camp application does not reach the level of agreement that due process should require for a section-956 violation.
The government's interpretation of conspiracy in the Padilla prosecution threatens accountability in other ways. Conspiracy charges after September 11 have laundered cases like Padilla's which originated in the shadow government of detention, surveillance, and torture. 10 The post-September 11 elevation of conspiracy in the prevention arsenal targeted vulnerable groups, including immigrants, Arabs, and South Asians, encouraged hyperbole and headline-seeking among government officials, and permitted the government to resurrect stale claims." In addition, reliance on conspiracy charges has prompted ethical lapses among government lawyers who have sometimes cared more about saving a weak case than about handing over exculpatory evidence.'2 The turn to prevention also outsources control to government informants who serve their own agendas rather than the public interest. 1 3 Indeed, rather than eliminate threats, the preventive paradigm may further polarize communities, enhancing the prospects for violence.
To use conspiracy as a weapon against political violence, law must navigate through a minefield of risks. Failing to heed those risks can make conspiracy cases an exercise in political posturing and self-fulfilling prophecy. All too often, prosecutors since September 11 have fallen into this trap. This Essay analyzes the problems with post-September 11 conspiracy law and suggests reforms.
The article has four parts. Part I addresses the history of conspiracy law and doctrine, arguing that conspiracy law threatens to destabilize the balance between false positives (people mistakenly punished) and false negatives (people mistakenly 8 .
See Goodnough & Shane, supra note 1 (reporting that the government's key evidence against Padilla involved an application form for training camp).
9. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (narrowly holding that the prosecution of active membership in a group advocating the violent overthrow of the government does not violate the First Amendment).
10.
See infra notes 120-131 and accompanying text (discussing the tangled path of Padilla's case).
11. See discussion infra Part II.C.
12.
See United States v. Koubriti 
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GONZAGA LAW REVIEW cleared). The risk of false positives rises in cases of alleged political violence. In the United States, political violence is a relatively low-incidence crime and the ratio of big talkers to committed perpetrators of violence is very high. Conspiracy law is a very blunt instrument for making this crucial distinction. Moreover, the dynamics of prosecution enhance the risk of false positives. Prosecutors are eager to handle conspiracy cases because they allow prosecutors to take the initiative, display their skills, and make an impact.
14 The prevalence of informants in conspiracy cases compounds this problem, since informants often have agendas of their own.
Part II of the article addresses the perfect storm of conspiracy doctrine and practice that developed after September 11. After September 11, conspiracy became a signature issue for a Justice Department eager to brand itself as a main player in the war on terror. In case like Jose Padilla's, conspiracy prosecution became a tool to legitimize the shadow government of detention, interrogation, and surveillance. Part II also argues that conspiracy prosecutions after September 11 have trafficked in vague charges, encouraged an onrush of hype, and exploited legal doctrine to refurbish stale cases.
Part III details the consequences of these problems for central values in the criminal justice system and national security policy. Prosecutors have suffered ethical lapses, particularly in the areas of withholding exculpatory evidence and engaging in prejudicial publicity. Conspiracy cases have also targeted ethnic and religious minorities and have played into stereotypes about Muslim and Arab violence. Moreover, conspiracy prosecutions leverage adverse juror reactions to extreme political speech in a fashion that judicial instructions cannot fully cure. Defenses to conspiracy, such as entrapment, also fail to deal with the problem of prejudice. Finally, conspiracy charges can be counter-productive, promoting resentment and a climate that favors increased violence.
Part IV acknowledges that conspiracy charges have a place in the war on terror and suggests reforms to refine the implementation of this powerful and dangerous tool. First, this Part suggests criteria to guide prosecutors. These criteria include suspects' prior illegal acts, advance knowledge of illegal activity, or special experience tailored to terrorism. Prosecutors and bar regulators should adopt guidelines to encourage greater deliberation about the discriminatory impact of charging decisions. Second, this Part suggests measures for courts seeking to control conspiracy prosecutions, including scrutinizing the fit between the defendant's actual agreement and the criminal agreement required under the relevant statute, making the test for an overt act furthering an agreement more rigorous and making entrapment a more robust defense with an "objective" component. [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS These proposals will not eliminate the threat of false positives, or wholly harmonize the amorphous nature of conspiracy doctrine within the rule of law. However, such proposals will promote greater reflectiveness and accountability for prosecutors in cases of alleged political violence. At the same time, they will better focus the legitimate prevention that conspiracy doctrine can provide in a dangerous world.
I. CONSPIRACY'S APPEAL TO PROSECUTORS AND ITS RISKS FOR THE RULE OF LAW

A. Conspiracy Doctrine and Democratic Values
Conspiracy "has been a favorite of prosecutors for centuries."' 5 A prosecutor charging defendants with conspiracy to murder need not show that a murder was committed.1 6 Indeed, it is not necessary to prove that the defendants even made an attempt.1 7 A jury need only find an agreement among two or more people, sometimes joined by some overt act in furtherance of that agreement.' 8 In the appropriate case, charging conspiracy serves legitimate law enforcement purposes. Consider the case of a group that plans to rob a bank and purchases a gun or car to assist that effort. Acquiring a gun or a vehicle is a token of the group's earnestness. The group's agreement is also a precommitment device with the eagerness of some members solidifying the resolve of the others.' 9 In this case, law enforcement should not have to wait until the group actually attempts a bank robbery. Viewed from a broader perspective, however, resort to conspiracy doctrine creates substantial tensions with democratic values.
In a constitutional democracy, criminal law requires that the government prove that the defendant is responsible for a past misdeed. The government should not have the power to imprison an individual for a status that is uncontrollable, such as 17. United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the government need not prove the commission of the offense or even knowledge of all details of the conspiracy).
18.
SeeBird, supranote 16, at 44.
19.
See Katyal , supra note 7, at 1346-50; cf Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644 (observing that conspiracy entails "educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices") (quoting United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) ); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 87-90 (2000) (discussing dynamics of group polarization, in which actions of members produce a "risky shift' in group behavior).
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2 1 In the modem area, the courts have struck down statutes, such as vagrancy laws, that permitted the government to exercise such sweeping authority. 22 The law considers future risks only in specially bounded areas of law, such as commitment of sexual predators or persons with mental disabilities.
23
Of course, some spillover is present between past responsibility and prevention-if the system imprisons a burglar for burglaries already committed, this incapacitation may also prevent burglaries in the future. However, this effect is incidental to adjudication of responsibility for a past wrong. Indeed, judges caution juries that their verdicts must be based on evidence demonstrating responsibility for a past offense, not on concern about future misconduct.
24
Conspiracy is different. The heart of a criminal conspiracy charge is the intangible element of agreement.
25 Agreements need not be express but can also be implicit. 26 Because of this intangible core, the government need only prove that the [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS defendant participated in a "vaguely criminal scheme," rather than showing that the defendant committed concrete criminal acts.
27 Justice Jackson described conspiracy as "chameleon-like, ' 28 focusing on an elusive "meeting of [the] minds" instead of on conduct. 29 As a result, jurors can convict when they perceive the defendant and his or her associates as possessing "a general disposition towards unlawful behavior. '30 Moreover, the doctrine of conspiracy encourages guilt by association: jurors who take a dislike to one defendant on trial may extend that dislike to the others. One factor that contributes to the amorphous nature of the agreement charged in conspiracy cases is that courts tend to interpret agreements broadly. 32 This expansive construction frequently exceeds a particular defendant's own understanding and capacities. 33 Once an agreement is in place, a defendant may be liable for acts in which he or she had no material role. 34 1155 (1973) . Where a defendant knows that another person is committing a criminal act and does something that enables the act, liability will hinge on whether the defendant has a special stake in the behavior, or on the seriousness of the act itself People v. Lauria, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the manager of a telephone answering service was not a co-conspirator of an individual who ran a prostitution ring, even though the manager knew that the ring used his service, when manager received no special compensation; the court reserved the question of whether knowledge and some enabling act would be sufficient to establish agreement in the case of a more serious crime).
28 [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS characteristic or event, and then make judgments that are consistent with that anchor. 45 Anchoring, like many other shortcuts in human judgment, can work in a "quick and dirty" way, but can also lead to serious mistakes. 46 Mistakes occur when the anchor is either unreliable, or is insufficiently related to the ultimate judgment being made.
In conspiracy law and proof, one anchor is the arrest and charging of the defendants. The allegations against the defendants are often extreme-particularly in terrorism cases. The human tendency is to treat the allegations as true and then reason backward in time for evidence that will support the charges. Viewed in hindsight, a nebulous agreement appears more concrete and routine or equivocal actions appear to further the agreement 7 Only later, if at all, do people ask whether the charges are accurate.
Rules for conspiracy trials compound this problem. Rules in most criminal cases seek to avoid errors that social scientists call "false positives" or finding someone 48 guilty of a crime that he or she has not committed. In a democracy, the law cares more about avoiding false positives than about avoiding false negatives or eople whom a jury finds not guilty even though they have committed a crime.
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard that the government must meet in criminal trials incorporates this crucial normative choice.
50
While many of the same rules, such as the standard of proof, also apply in conspiracy trials, the emphasis is different. More than other criminal cases, guilty defendants in conspiracy trials find it harder to use the requirements of the justice system to their advantage. The result is a greater risk of false positives.
To prevent conspiracy defendants from exploiting the secrecy that marks a successful plot, 5 1 courts relax rules on the reliability and specificity of evidence. For example, the prosecution can rely on hearsay that would otherwise be inadmissible. 53 Participants do not need to know the details of an alleged plan nor do they need to know each other. They can resemble spokes in a wheel, acting without express coordination to achieve a common goal. 54 Moreover, their ends may overlap but need not be identical. In essence, as Justice Jackson noted, the government can present a "hodgepodge" that a defendant cannot hope to disprove in every particular. 55 Unless a jury seeks more specific evidence, the court will usually instruct the jury that insisting on a "smoking gun" merely rewards the cunning conspirator. 56 The entire framework is a recipe for false positives. As senior federal judges noted starkly in a report more than seventy-five years ago to Chief Justice Taft, "the rules of evidence in conspiracy cases make them most difficult to try without prejudice to an innocent defendant." The risk of government overreaching in conspiracy cases is highest in cases of alleged political violence. Here, too, cognitive psychology enlightens our analysis. Cognitive psychologists have found that people tend to overestimate the likelihood of events that are vivid and emotionally salient. 61 Airplane crashes are a useful example: people fear airplane crashes far more than they fear car accidents, although the latter occur far more frequently and cause exponentially greater harm. Terrorist attacks are another example. Legitimate outrage at the targeting of civilians by terrorists can obscure the rarity of these attacks in the United States. The September 11 hijackings made many people reluctant to fly for months afterward, despite the statistically rare chance of injury or death arising from terrorism during airplane travel. 62 Since terrorism in this country has an exceedingly low incidence of occurrence, separating the committed terrorist from the big talker is difficult. The terrorist and the "wanna-be" may talk the same talk; indeed, the "wanna-be" may be less guarded than the truly dangerous individual. While the best prosecutors seek to factor in this concern, other officials trot out conspiracy charges to stoke the public's fear and make political points.
History demonstrates that officials often use conspiracy charges against political foes. Centuries ago, Sir Walter Raleigh was charged with conspiracy when he became a political threat. 63 [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS the White House in an effort to secure additional money. 73 Similarly, informants used in sting operations have an incentive to push, cajole, and browbeat their targets into more and more damaging statements and admissions, just as undercover agents have an incentive to get targets in drug prosecutions to buy or sell larger amounts of drugs that will trigger stiffer sentences. A substantial number of post-September 11 conspiracy cases involved young men targeted by stings in this way, who may have never come close to an illegal agreement without such an informant's influence.
74
Both informants and sting operations tend to target people of a particular race or ethnic background. Although commentators and activists regularly clamor for police to run more stings on kids from the suburbs buying drugs, buy and bust stings are regularly run on residents of inner-city neighborhoods. 75 Sting operations have the same problem with selective targeting in the terrorism context. It hardly seems likely that police running a sting operation to arrest members of potential sleeper cells will target a group of middle-aged Mah Jongg players from the suburbs. Instead, police and prosecutors will focus on institutions and residents of neighborhoods that are predominantly Muslim, Middle Eastern, or South Asian.
76
Prosecutors have an incentive to ignore the risks posed by reliance on informants.
77 Senior government officials care more about making a splash with a high-profile arrest than about subsequent difficulties with the case, which typically receive less attention from the media. Moreover, prosecutors often buy into the tales spun by informers, just as Bush administration officials snapped up the exaggerated accounts of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction relayed by Iraqi exiles. 
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GONZAGA LAW REVIEW the benefits of prestige and bragging rights. Prosecutors also want to take the initiative. Using informants and sting operations, prosecutors appear in control of the law enforcement agenda. 9 Without a portfolio of such projects, prosecutors cede the initiative to their adversaries on the other side of the law.
As with all portfolios, over-investing in informants and sting operations creates risks. The best prosecutors are effective gatekeepers, winnowing out unreliable informants and cutting losses when investigations yield little of value. Too often, however, prosecutors stick with cases that are going south, "doubling down" like an investor who is sure that a declining stock will rebound .
In sting operations, competitive prosecutors may experience disappointment when a subject seems to lose interest in the terrorist venture that the informant or undercover agent has proposed. For example, agents seeking to get a Bronx jazz bassist, Tarik Shah, to commit to terrorist activity had to play second-fiddle to the target's interest in working out and making gigs. A gatekeeping prosecutor would have taken the target's distraction as evidence that his occasionally extreme talk did not dovetail with an interest in action. Instead, however, the prosecutors in this case re-doubled their efforts, eventually persuading their target to participate in a mock swearing-in ceremony for Al Qaeda
82
and promise to provide martial arts training for the group. By getting Shah to take the bait, the government salvaged its investment and obtained a guilty plea from
83
Shah, thus foregoing a public trial.
Nevertheless, a gatekeeping prosecutor could reasonably ask whether the operation succeeded only in netting a false positive, who would not have acted without protracted efforts by law enforcement agents.
In addition to the problems posed by unreliable informants, invidious assumptions and prepackaged scripts may skew the path of an investigation. In the terrorism enforcement context, for example, pervasive scripts about the prevalence of terrorism within Islam or among Arabs and South Asians can skew prosecutorial decisions. 84 Here, the best prosecutors will acknowledge the influence of such images and manage their cases accordingly However, less reflective prosecutors lack this insight.
79.
Cf Richman, supra note 14, at 798-800 (discussing the nature of prosecutors' incentives In the wake of September 11, the preventive goals of conspiracy law became a signature of senior officials seeking strategic, political, and institutional advantage. As a matter of effective antiterror strategy, the catastrophic losses of September 11 argued for a revision of the traditional American acceptance of some false negatives to avoid false positives. In fact, the government needed an appropriately tailored flexibility in some areas to address the gravity of the risk posed by terrorism. Conspiracy cases should be part of this antiterrorist repertoire. However, the Bush administration's reliance on conspiracy cases exceeded this prescription. While the motivation of these officials encompassed dismay at the attacks and an understandable desire to prevent future harm, their moves bolstered a monolithic model of law enforcement that undermined checks and balances.
Attorney General John Ashcroft wasted no time in marginalizing the deliberative virtues extolled by predecessors such as Robert Jackson, Attorney General under Franklin D. Roosevelt, 85 who as a Supreme Court justice articulated a pioneering vision of the limits of executive power. 86 Ashcroft pointedly evoked Robert Kennedy, warning that the Justice Department would arrest potential terrorists for "spitting on the sidewalk," as Kennedy had cautioned racketeers. 87 Unfortunately, Ashcroft's reference to Robert Kennedy (who Ashcroft, in fairness, seems to have sincerely admired) concealed one essential difference between the situations facing the two men.
Kennedy's prey, including labor racketeers such as Jimmy Hoffa of the Teamsters union, 88 engaged in corruption as a way of doing business.
89
Their wrongdoing was open and notorious, at least in union circles. They had succeeded in avoiding accountability before Kennedy because they bribed, intimidated, or killed potential witnesses. Indeed, the successful racketeer burnished his reputation to instill fear and enrich himself and his associates. Because of these factors, the likelihood of Kennedy punishing the wrong people was minimal and the problem of false positives did not afflict his efforts. 9° In contrast, the base rates for political violence are very low and American terrorists tend to keep to themselves.
85.
See 229, 232 (2003) .
90. For a more critical view of Kennedy's use of an informant in the investigation of corrupt
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9 ' Unfortunately, Ashcroft ignored the telling discontinuities between the Bush administration's efforts and Kennedy's approach.
While prosecutors have a legitimate interest in keeping the public apprised about their activities, John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales elevated public information about alleged conspiracies to the level of political theatre. In the spring of 2002, Ashcroft took time out from a trip to Moscow to broadcast the news that the FBI had arrested United States citizen Jose Padilla at the O'Hare Airport in Chicago in an alleged plot to acquire a "dirty bomb. 92 Ashcroft went public about another terrorism case, the Koubriti case from Detroit, claiming shortly after September 11 that the defendants had advance notice of the attacks. 93 Ashcroft also asserted that John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban," had engaged in a significant conspiracy against the United States. 94 Despite thin evidence of an active role in the attacks, he sought the death penalty for Zacarias Moussaoui, who had engaged in flight training on Al Qaeda's behalf before September 11. 95 The promotion of Alberto Gonzales to Attorney General maintained the government's reliance on conspiracy. Gonzales had been heavily involved in designing the President's overall legal strategy on terrorism, including the infamous torture memos justifying interrogation techniques that were prohibited under both international and domestic law. 96 Gonzales continued the preventive focus of the labor boss Jimmy Hoffa, see generally Spritzer, supra note 88.
91.
See EVAN THOMAS, ROBERT KENNEDY: His LiFE 252 (2000) (noting that Kennedy realized that FBI Director Hoover "grossly exaggerated the communist threat; indeed, the attorney general was always nudging the director to move his agents away from infiltrating the moribund American Communist Party to investigating the real threat, organized crime").
92. In each of these cases, the government ultimately had to retreat from its initial public assertions. For example, Padilla, despite his recent conviction, has never been charged with seeking a dirty bomb. 98 In the Koubriti case, the government ultimately had to move to throw out the convictions it had obtained because it had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. 99 While Lindh pleaded guilty and is currently serving a twenty-year sentence for taking up arms against the United States, the facts in his case ruled out any grand conspiracy, revealing him as a young man who had taken up with the Taliban in a low-level position because of faulty judgment, distorted idealism, and a very poor sense of timing.
1 00 While Moussaoui was by his own admission in training to be a terrorist, the case for his participation in the September 11 plot was strained at best and the government's request for the death penalty was unfair, in light of the refusal to provide access to detainees who could offer exculpatory information.'01
A. Statutory Foundations and Law Enforcement Performance since September 11
In implementing their signature prevention approach, Ashcroft and then later Gonzales, turned to statutes that prohibited terrorist activity. Such laws prohibit preliminary efforts to provide assistance (or "material support," in the statutory language) to terrorist acts and groups. 102 The material support statutes exhibit the precarious balance between false positives and false negatives that mark all conspiracy law. While the government can enforce the statutes in core cases without However, the government is not required to prove that defendants had identified any particular target.
10 8 For example, in United States v. Sattar, the government alleged that the defendants violated section 956 by persuading Sheik Abdel Rahman, the so-called "blind sheik" imprisoned for life, for conspiring to attack the United States military and assassinate Egyptian President Mubarak, and to recommend that his group withdraw from a cease-fire that it had agreed to after an attack that killed over sixty tourists in Egypt in 1997.109 After persuading Abdel Rahman of this course of action, the defendants, including Lynne Stewart, a well-known criminal defense lawyer, also [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS undertook to publicize the sheik's decision.° Neither the discussions with the imprisoned sheik, which involved the deception of federal correctional authorities, nor the subsequent public announcement by Stewart of the change in Abdel Rahman's position involved specific plans for terrorist activity."
1 However, the judge in the case ruled that such specificity was not required.1 2 Once the court found that the prosecution could constituionally charge the defendants with a violation of section 956 on these facts, it further found that the facts would also support a prosecution under section 2339A for lending material support to this terrorist activity. 113 When the facts cement this link between section 956 and the material support statutes, the government can prosecute conduct that appears highly amorphous. For example, the government has argued that the provision of the material support statute barring the provision of "personnel" to terrorist activity includes a defendant providing himself to the global 'jihad movement."
The second prong of the material support statute, section 2339B, criminalizes material support of a group officially designated by the Secretary of State as a "foreign terrorist organization." 115 Here, too, core cases seem both permissible and appropriate. For example, courts have repeatedly upheld the bar on furnishing of funds to groups acting contrary to the law or causing harm, such as Hamas. 116 In upholding these provisions, courts have noted that such provisions burden free speech only in an incidental manner. Nothing in the statute prohibits protected speech, including praise of Hamas. In addition, the statute fulfills an important government objective: the denial of support to a foreign group with a track record of violence. GONZAGA LAW REVIEW However, here, too, enforcement beyond core cases can expand to threaten protected activity and target particular groups. In addition, rigid enforcement can be counterproductive, enhancing the standing of entrepreneurs of violent ideology and discrediting more moderate elements.
8
The terrorism cases brought after September 11 against this legal background reflect an overall lack of prosecutorial judgment. In the most troubling cases, prosecutors and national security officials have used conspiracy charges to leverage the shadow govemment of detention and coercive interrogation established at Guantanamo. 119 The government has also exploited the amorphous nature of conspiracy by charging defendants with assistance to the global "jihad movement," not to specific plots. In addition, prosecutors have used conspiracy to target terrorist wannabes or resurrect stale cases involving conduct from the 1990's. Even where government investigation is appropriate, such as the recent cases involving alleged plots against Fort Dix and JFK Airport, the use of informants to encourage and enable the defendants undercuts the government's claims about the seriousness of the threats. Indeed, the hype generated by these prosecutions also heightens the risk that officials will later cut legal comers to save a case headed for collapse.
B. Conspiracy and Antiterror Prosecution as a Tool of Shadow Government
The conspiracy and material support laws invoked by Ashcroft and Gonzales have strengthened the shadow governance systems that the Bush Administration established after September 11. The government used the sweeping language of the material support laws to launder detentions that would otherwise have been impermissible. To illustrate the role of material support prosecutions in legitimating and laundering shadow government, consider the case of Jose Padilla.
Padilla 
121
For much of this time, the government also refused to permit Padilla to meet with his attorneys."' Justifying these extraordinary measures, the government told at least four distinct stories. These stories culminated not in a trip to Guantanamo or some "black site" operated by a friendly government abroad, but in a conspiracy conviction for amorphous conduct that occurred almost ten years ago. 123 The first and most salient government justification for Padilla's detention was the claim that high-ranking Al Qaeda operatives had tasked Padilla with the job of assembling a "dirty bomb" containing nuclear radiation.' 24 When it appeared that many of the statements demonstrating this story were obtained by torture, the government proceeded to plan B. According to this narrative, Padilla had intended to blow up apartment buildings, perhaps by leaving on the gas stove in an apartment. have to prove that Padilla had participated in a more specific plan, sought a dirty bomb, or plotted to blow up apartment buildings. 129 Assessing the government's move, Judge Luttig inferred that the government had engaged in a legal "bait and switch" operation, arguing Plan C to secure a favorable ruling from the Fourth Circuit, and pivoting to Plan D to avoid Supreme Court review.' 30 For Judge Luttig, who wrote in the anguished tone of a disappointed true believer, the pivot toward conspiracy damaged the government's credibility, by fostering the impression that Padilla's long detention had been a "mistake." Whatever Luttig's disappointment, Padilla's conviction on conspiracy charges will most likely moot the legality of his lengthy detention outside the criminal justice system. 31
The utility of conspiracy and material support charges for the post-September 11 shadow government extends beyond Padilla's case. In several other cases, the government has used conspiracy charges to convict and punish defendants who had been subject to abusive interrogations.' 32 These individuals included David Hicks, The government has also interfered with access to counsel for detainees and others through measures such as attorney-client monitoring. Conspiracy legitimated the shadow government in another way, hinging on investigative and surveillance techniques. The material support case often involved evidence obtained through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), where applications for warrants go to a special court on vague allegations that the proposed subject is an "agent of a foreign power" (including a terrorist organization), instead of going to local judicial officers.' 36 FISA lacks the local base or the concreteness of the warrant procedure in the federal districts. The vast increase in FISA warrants since September 11 fuels concern that conspiracy cases allowed the government to bypass local gatekeepers.
The legitimation of shadow government also reaches into the plea negotiation stage. He also acknowledged that he had visited the Brooklyn Bridge, to assess the feasibility of bringing down the bridge by cutting through the bridge's suspension cables with torches.
14 1 Faris and the government disputed whether Faris had simply driven across the bridge or had examined it in greater detail. 142 Both sides acknowledged, however, that Faris had reported back that the plan was not feasible. 143 At trial, Faris could have argued that he had always known that the idea was not plausible and that he informed others after driving over the bridge, as millions do every year. 144 In this case, as in a number of others involving thin facts and frail plots, the "difference-maker" in agreeing to plead guilty rather than go to trial may have been the prospect of solitary confinement and coercive interrogation at Guantanamo Bay. Recourse to conspiracy material support in the military commission context raises substantial concerns about policy, fairness, and the integrity of legal proceedings. Generally, offenses against the law of war have focused on a few core areas, including violence against civilians, torture and cruel treatment of captives, and the unjustified use of force against nations or populations. Concentrating on these core areas ensures wide agreement within the international community.' 5 ' Including more amorphous offenses, such as material support, threatens that international consensus and distracts from the clear principles underlying this body of law. 1 52 The amorphous nature of conspiracy charges also creates a further danger, compounded by the difficulty of securing concrete evidence about wrongdoing abroad. Because of the difficulty of obtaining evidence, conspiracy charges may become a cover for criminalizing mere membership in an organization.
1 53 This problem enhances the risk of guilt by association that always lurks in conspiracy doctrine. GONZAGA 
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Charging crimes like material support in military commissions also raises fundamental questions of fair notice. In our system, an individual must have notice that conduct is criminal before being prosecuted or punished. 1 54 When an individual must resort to a crystal ball to discern what conduct today will be criminal in the future, the state is playing "gotcha," not dispensing justice. Sadly, Congress set the stage for this sad spectacle when it passed the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which makes material support a violation triable before a military commission.
55
The Administration proceeded to charge detainees including Salim Hamdan and the Australian, David Hicks, with providing material support, even though their alleged acts occurred before the MCA became law.' 56 When Hicks agreed to a plea bargain after spending almost five years in harsh confinement at Guantanamo, he admitted to conduct remarkably similar to the acts cited in material support cases--"casing" buildings for possible future terrorist attacks. 157 However, the law of war almost certainly did not prohibit these acts at the time Hicks committed them. 58 Consequently, the charges against Hicks lacked the fundamental element of notice.
159
Pivoting toward conspiracy in the Hicks plea agreement also allowed the terrorists, while acknowledging that "[s]ome alleged terrorists have not committed overt crimes and can be tried only on a conspiracy theory that comes close to criminalizing group membership").
154 [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS administration to camouflage the use of harsh interrogation methods that were used on detainees in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo for much of this period. 160 Conspiracy and material support charges in military commissions also encourage overreliance on informers and sting operations. The monitoring of informants and sting operations is difficult enough in a domestic legal system, where informants' private agendas frustrate efforts at quality control.
'
In the international arena, developing accurate information is even more challenging. Informants' agendas proliferate, and contacts that build up trust over time give way to casual exchanges of information that no government can monitor for accuracy.' 62 In Afghanistan, for example, the United States relied on bounty hunters who received thousands of dollars, and then disappeared into the maze of tribal existence. 63 While some genuine terrorists were probably caught, it seems certain that the informants profiled their prey, handing over Arabs en masse. The whole slipshod process reinforced Justice O'Connor's concern in the Hamdi case that many detainees might be false positives-not hardened terrorists, but aid workers, journalists, or pilgrims in the wrong place at the wrong time.'
64
C. Remaining Problems with Conspiracy: Unfair Attribution, Hype, and Stale Cases
Even charges that do not directly bolster the Bush administration's shadow government of detention and interrogation can be unfairly amorphous, exaggerated, or stale. Here too, accusations of conspiracy and material support are convenient vessels. Indeed, these problems are more insidious, since they do not send off the flares that mark obvious paradigm shifts like the Administration's detention of alleged enemy combatants.
Amorphous Prosecutions and Unfair Attribution
A central concern in any regime of group liability is the congruency between the aims and acts fairly attributable to the group and those of the individual defendant. An unduly narrow view of the individual defendant's aims and acts will make conspiracy impossible to prove. However, a sweeping view of the relationship between the individual and the group will impose liability on the individual for acts and aims outside of his control, in which his interest was remote, contingent, or generic. Moreover, imposing liability for acts and aims closely related to speech 
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GONZAGA LAW REVIEW triggers tensions with the First Amendment. Recent terror prosecutions, including the trial of Jose Padilla and his co-defendants, raise these risks. Consider first the case of Kifah Jayyousi, convicted along with Jose Padilla on conspiracy charges. The charges against Jayyousi centered on his alleged recruitment of individuals like Padilla to attend terrorist training camps, and on his sending of supplies such as satellite-phones to Chechnya.
1 65 The recruitment charges were very general, since the evidence backing them up concerned Jayyousi's management of a regular publication that espoused Islamist ideas-activity that would typically be covered by the First Amendment. To make this into conspiracy, the government had to allege that the publication was merely a front for generating new training camp recruits. The government made these sorts of arguments during the McCarthy Era. Reviving them does not bode well for First Amendment rights.
Similarly, in Jayyousi's case the government could not specify the exact destination of the satellite-phones sent to Chechnya, and whether they helped terrorist fighters or simply refugees from the violence there.' 6 6 Particularly since violence has occurred on both sides in the bitter Chechnyan conflict, proof that Jayyousi intended that the phones facilitate violence was thin. However, conspiracy charges allowed the government to take its chances, with victory arguably hinging less on concrete evidence and more on the jury's assessment of Jayyousi's "general disposition." Several levels of contingency separate Padilla's bid from efforts to murder, maim, or kidnap persons abroad. First, submission of an application did not necessarily lead to attendance. Second, many attendees at the camps did not follow up on their training, because they became disillusioned, discovered other priorities, or followed prudent counsel to refrain from further activity.169 Third, even those who did not fall away from Al Qaeda did not necessarily collaborate in schemes to commit violent acts. Viewed in this light, the 17 2 However, courts should not view violating this prohibition as a spoke in the same wheel that includes actual terrorist attacks.
See
While the government has not expressly relied on a "hub and spokes" theory in post-September 11 cases, this is the effect of the government's sweeping interpretation of section 956. The problems that the Supreme Court identified in a case like Kotteakos with an unduly expansive view of hub and spokes conspiracies also pervade Padilla's prosecution. 173 The heart of Justice Rutledge's concern in
Kotteakos was the unfairness of attributing to one defendant the responsibility for 172. Moreover, the act of traveling abroad, as well as the myriad acts of collaboration and peer learning implicit in training camp participation, arguably make this behavior conduct, not merely speech, for First Amendment purposes. Prohibiting active participation in training camps abroad (as opposed to prohibiting a visit to the camp for the purpose of reporting for a media outlet) is arguably not a restriction on political speech, but merely an incidental restriction on speech caused by permissible regulation of conduct. Padilla's case, while it shares some features with the integrated drug trafficking enterprise, is ultimately closer to the separate transactions analyzed in Kotteakos. The common features are obvious: an organization such as Al Qaeda needs personnel, and Padilla provided himself Padilla's application to the camp indicates that he shared the murderous ideology of Al Qaeda higher-ups. Upon closer examination, however, the analogy to the drug enterprise breaks down. While Al Qaeda needs people to implement its aims, it shares this need with all organizations with illegal or, for that matter, legal goals. In the drug context scenario, the law does not prohibit individuals from training to become traffickers. Establishing culpability requires participation in some aspect of the enterprise's operations, including transportation, distribution, or finance. The relationship between undergoing training, joining in operations, and planning operations more closely resembles a pyramid than a hub and spokes. In considering how far down the pyramid liability should extend for the violent acts of the group, courts should stop at the operations level. While the state can prohibit participating as a trainee, it should punish this conduct as a discrete offense, rather than attributing to trainees the violent acts of the organization.
One can argue that the ideology behind terrorist groups should pernit a broader construction of the agreement made by the terrorist trainee. Unlike the participants in the individual loan transactions in Kotteakos, the terrorist trainee arguably has a stake in all of the terrorist group's activities. The participant in the fraudulent loan transaction presumably cares only about money. It makes sense, therefore, to cabin his liability at the frontier of his financial concem with the single transaction. In contrast, the terrorist trainee's ideology makes him concerned with the success of each of the terrorist group's enterprises. 177 However, attribution of responsibility based on ideological sympathies is problematic.
Attribution of this kind, triggered by alleged participation in the global "jihad movement," raises substantial First Amendment concerns. One can view Padilla's application to the training camp as an application for membership in Al Qaeda, or as evidence of his attendance and hence his membership. In practical terms, this theory echoes the government's theory in Dennis, that mere membership in the Communist Party indicates an intent to overthrow the government by force and violence. [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS membership is political speech. 179 On this view, the offensiveness of the speech is irrelevant to the protection that the First Amendment affords. In both the Communist Party and Al Qaeda examples, some members of each organization clearly engaged in violence, espionage, or other harmful conduct. 180 However, imputing this harmful conduct to all members of the organization violates the modem understanding of the First Amendment that the Supreme Court derived after decisions in the crucible of the McCarthy Era.
Hype
The advantages of conspiracy and material support charges have also helped the government convict a number of one-time terrorist wannabes whose connections to acts of violence are tenuous. In United States v. Hayat, the government prosecuted a young man who may have attended some kind of training camp in Pakistan, although the government never alleged that the camp was an Al Qaeda facility or identified its nature and location.' 8 1 The case was brought to the government by an informant, who was paid a six-figure amount for his work.' 82 In another recent case, the government secured a guilty plea from a Bronx bass player, Tarik Shah, who swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in a ceremony staged by federal agents after promising an informant that he would provide martial arts training.' 83 The government's own indictment acknowledges that the plot to provide martial arts training lay fallow for months as Shah focused on working out and getting gigs. In a recent case in Miami involving a religious sect of Haitian-Americans that an informant had allegedly persuaded to collect data on South Florida and Chicago buildings, the informant also The "punch line" [, according to the juror,] was that he thought these cases were more than a jury could handle. "We're not being asked, 'Did the defendant commit the crime?' -whether it's larceny, murder, whatever. Now you're being asked, 'Is the defendant capable of doing a crime?' And I don't think that that is in the... level of understanding of the juror."
Id. at *7; see also Chesney, supra note 4, at 87-92 (discussing the Hayat case). 183. See Feuer, supra note 81.
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84
This pattern also holds in the recent cases that attracted vast media attention, involving alleged plots to attack Fort Dix and JFK Airport respectively. In both of these cases, a number of the defendants expressed ambivalence when informants tried to "up the ante." '1 85 In the Fort Dix case, for example, the defendants reacted negatively when the informant suggested that the group use rocket-propelled grenade launchers ("RPG's").
18
Bona fide terrorists would have presumably leapt at the chance.
18 7 Even in the JFK case, where the alleged originator of the plan had worked at the airport, 188 at least one party to the alleged plot expressed concerns about minimizing casualties' 89 which would seem incongruous in a committed terrorist. Each of these two recent headline-grabbing cases also involve other indicia of exaggeration, centering on the role of government informants. In the Fort Dix case, an FBI agent's affidavit reflects a gap of almost five months between the informant's infiltration of the alleged conspiracy and the discussion of Fort Dix as a target by one of the defendants.1 90 Left unclear is whether the informant himself brought up Fort Dix in earlier conversations. In the JFK Airport case, the government funneled money to the informant to finance trips to Trinidad in firtherance of the alleged 184. See Shane & Zarate, supra note 97. In the case that raised the most legitimate concern about violence, an informant whom the government had paid over $100,000 entered into an agreement with a young man to plan to explode a bomb at New York , at BI. In this case, which resulted in a conviction, the views consistently expressed by the young man were profoundly disturbing, and the stakes were huge, given the volume of traffic through the station and the potential for massive casualties. Even in this case, however, the informant seemed to be the prime mover behind the scheme. The actual steps taken to further the plot were tentative and limited to inspecting some bags to determine if they could hold explosives. [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS conspiracy. 191 The defendants lacked the resources to take these trips on their own. Although conspiracy law does not and should not require that suspects have independent capabilities, the informant's dominance suggests that the government may be picking convenient targets, rather than preventing violence.
Stale Claims
Conspiracy charges also give a tactical advantage to prosecutors because they perform a makeover on stale claims. Since even routine acts can further a conspiracy, prosecutors can lengthen the duration of the alleged plan by citing minor conduct far more recent than the plot's core events. Consider here the press conference at which John Ashcroft announced the indictment on conspiracy and racketeering charges of Muhammad Salah for allegedly providing financial aid to Hamas.
192 Ashcroft touted the charges as demonstrating a "I 5-year racketeering conspiracy."' 93 In truth, the last significant events in the alleged conspiracy occurred in 1993.
In 1993, Salah was arrested on the West Bank and interrogated extensively by Israeli agents.
194 After a lengthy interrogation that may have included techniques subsequently prohibited by Israeli courts, 1 95 he was convicted and spent a number of years in jail in Israel. Because of acts only collaterally related to terrorism, including allegedly providing false answers in responses to a civil lawsuit, the government was able to argue that the conspiracy was ongoing, even though this claim exaggerated the conspiracy's nature and scope. 196 Although the government had earlier designated Salah as a terrorist without a hearing and frozen his assets, he was finally acquitted of the principal terrorist charges in 2007.197 However, since Salah was convicted of obstruction based on his false answers in the discovery phase of a civil lawsuit, law enforcement authorities have been able to leverage this alleged early 1990's agreement into more prison time. 198 This leveraging of conspiracy to encompass wrongdoing remote in time is a feature of other terrorism prosecutions. In the case of Sami AI-Arian, for example, the government charged the defendant with terror fimdraising occurring prior to 
See
I. CONSPIRACY'S DISCONTENTS: ETHICAL LAPSES, STEREOTYPES, AND SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECIES
The hazards of conspiracy charges in national security cases affect trial tactics and potentially undermine law enforcement concerns in the long run. As law enforcement officials scramble to protect their investment in a shaky case, ethical lapses can proliferate. In addition, the law has not dealt adequately with the risk that juries will draw forbidden inferences based on the defendant's ethnicity or his political views. Finally, reliance on conspiracy prosecutions may be counterproductive in the long term, building resentment and despair in targeted communities. A similar danger exists with respect to crimes such as perjury or obstruction ofjustice that occur during an investigation Id. at 617-18. Here, too, the government can manipulate the process to gain leverage on a defendant targeted for other reasons. While the government has legitimate bases for enforcing immigration laws and laws that promote integrity and accuracy in investigations, prosecutorial discretion in enforcement decisions creates a possibility of abuse. In the worst case scenario, an irresponsible prosecutor may target a person first and come up with a charge later. This mindset, encouraged by the linkage between conspiracy, immigration, and investigation-related crimes, threatens the rule of law. See Jackson, supra note 85, at 19 ("If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.").
201. See Superseding Indictment, supra note 98, at 5-18.
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A. Ethical Issues
The conspiracy cases reveal a litany of ethical lapses by government attorneys. Prosecutors have not only a constitutional duty to hand over evidence disproving guilt, but also an ethical duty to be honest with the court. Similarly, ethical rules require that prosecutors try their cates in the courtroom, not in the shifting winds of public opinion. 20 2 However, the pressure of high-profile terrorism cases tempts prosecutors to cut comers.
To arrested the defendants in Detroit shortly after September 11, 2001. The men had been staying in an apartment formerly rented by an individual sought by the government in connection with the attacks. 05 In the apartment, authorities found a number of items of interest, including a drawing that appeared to be a sketch of an American air base in Turkey and a video that appeared to have been an effort to "case" sites in Las Vegas for possible attack.
20 6 The government charged each of the defendants with conspiracy. Unfortunately for the preventive ideal, very little about the Koubriti case turned out to be real. Before the trial, the government's own experts had discredited the prosecution's theory that the drawing depicted an American air base. Instead, the experts said, the drawing was more likely simply a crude drawing of the Middle East.
2 12 Experts cast similar doubt on the prosecution's theory about the Las Vegas video, viewing it as generic tourist footage. 213 However, the prosecutor in the case failed to alert the defense to the views of his experts. 2 14 Meanwhile, the informer Ashcroft praised so highly had, as it turned out, fabricated or exaggerated much of his testimony 2 15 Even before the trial, the judge presiding over the case forced Ashcroft to retract his statement that the defendants had received advance notice of the September 11 attacks, as both prejudicial and unsupported by proof. 216 Subsequently, the judge admonished Ashcroft for his laudatory comments during trial about the prosecution's chief witness. 2 17
After the defendants had spent well over a year in prison, pressure from defense lawyers and the court forced the government's hand. In an extraordinary submission to the court, the government acknowledged the warnings of its experts and the problems with its informant and moved to vacate the convictions. 18 The government also charged the prosecutor in the case with obstruction of justice. 2 1 9 On this view, the prosecutor was a "bad apple," echoing the Administration's story about errant guards practicing torture and humiliation on the night shift at Abu Ghraib. 220 The bad apple theory does not explain, however, why the prosecutor got word before trial that despite clear indications of future problems, higher-ups were pleased with the case. 
B. Policy Problems and Self-Fulfilling Prophecies
The reliance on informers in the conspiracy cases creates other problems of policy and integrity. In a case like Koubriti, the informer turned out to be inaccurate and unreliable, spinning tales that his patrons in law enforcement wanted to hear.
222
In other cases, too, citizens expecting integrity in government should wonder about testimony that was bought and paid for with ample cash, or informers seeking to stave off their own prosecution on drug and racketeering charges.
Other problems stem from the culture of informing nurtured by such law enforcement tactics. As commentators have noted, surveillance sometimes acts not as a deterrent, but as a catalyst for illegal behavior. Communities resent intrusive methods and work collectively to thwart them. 223 Alienation and resentment become the coin of the realm in community discourse. In this environment, voices of moderation lose credibility.
4
Moreover, when communities fear informers, discussion and debate will go underground. Without the tempering effect of ventilating diverse views in the public square, groups preach only to the choir. Communities become more polarized. This polarization can produce more violence in the future. In a sense, reliance on informers to deal with the political violence robs Peter to pay Paul-it nets results today, but may build a more determined and dangerous terrorist tomorrow.
C. Stereotypes
The impact of conspiracy prosecutions on precious First Amendment freedoms also contributes to polarization. Courts have failed to adequately address this issue. Blackletter law allows the government to present a defendant's extreme political views as evidence of motive and agreement with co-conspirators. 225 However, it is impossible to police the effect that such material has on a jury. The result is that a significant risk exists that defendants will be convicted because of their opinions and not because of their conduct. This is not merely a problem in terrorism cases. Many criminal cases entail some risk of invidious factors influencing juries. For example, it is possible that the Herbert Wechsler, law professor and drafter of the Model Penal Code, in failing to point out inaccuracies in government report that falsely accused Japanese-Americans of using radio equipment to contact Japanese fleet).
222. 
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GONZAGA LAW REVIEW ethnic identity of defendants in organized crime cases serves as a signal to the jury that the defendants are guilty-juries are more willing to assume guilt if the defendant's last name ends with a vowel, 226 despite the instruction that a judge might give to the contrary.
2 27 We know from our history that juries were often prejudiced against people of color. 228 However, even more reason to be concerned exists today about prejudice in the context of terrorism prosecutions.
First, changes in jury selection have helped ameliorate the problems in other areas. For example, government can no longer use preemptory challenges to keep
,229
African-Americans off juries.
In contrast, the numbers of Arab-Americans, South Asian-Americans, or Muslim-Americans are still so low that getting adequate representation in a jury pool is unlikely. Moreover, popular images of these groups are so negative that many members of the jury pool from other backgrounds will 230 experience at least some subtle prejudice.
Indeed, these images are so ubiquitous that the prejudice may be unconscious23 .-all the more dangerous for being something that people will not recognize and acknowledge in the jury selection process.
Another problem is the asymmetry between the starkness of the opinions expressed by defendants to informants and what the government actually has to prove in conspiracy cases. The government merely has to prove agreement and some overt act. Here, again, the problem of low base rates undermines the jury's deliberative role. The vast majority of people with extreme political opinions are no more likely than anyone else to act on them. Indeed, it is possible that those with extreme opinions vent their frustration through expressing those sentiments, thereby dissipating anger that might otherwise fester into violence. The calming effect of such venting in the public square is one pragmatic justification for democracy. However, in a conspiracy case, evidence of the large cohort of inactive people is either irrelevant to the charge of agreement, or ineffective for the defense.
Even if it is unlikely that the defendants would have followed through with the plot, this does not legally rebut the prosecution's case. As a matter of law, the likelihood of follow-through is irrelevant. Mere agreement is enough and the law says that moments of ambivalence do not rebut proof of a general underlying agreement. In any case, information about base rates of violence is less vivid and therefore less persuasive than the extreme opinions of this defendant. Here, as elsewhere, operating from individual cases instead of base rates can skew outcomes.
A jury may also reason backward from the claimed object of the conspiracy to the proof of agreement. Suppose that the government has charged the defendants with conspiring to destroy the JFK Airport, as a recent case alleges."' Cognitive psychologists tell us that people tend to find proof more persuasive when the potential harm is horrific. Surrendering to this syndrome, the jury may adapt the government's preventive rationale and reason that it is prudent to remove even a small risk of a major disaster. In this way, allegations of political violence turn our constitutional commitment to avoiding false positives on its head. "Better safe than sorry" no longer means voting to acquit to avoid imprisoning the innocent. Instead, it means that prevention of harm requires a guilty verdict even on thin evidence.
Affirmative defenses to conspiracy are nearly always futile. Our current law of entrapment requires that the defendant have no predisposition toward crime.
2 34 Here, though, the defendant's opinions also play a role in confirming that the defendant has a predisposition. Moreover, the law of entrapment also permits a wide range of government enticements. One of the few cases where the courts found entrapment involved an informant's effort to persuade participants at a rehab clinic to engage in 235 drug trafficking.
The Court condemned the government's effort to troll for drug suspects among people sincerely committed to kicking the habit. 236 However, the modest standard set by this case does not adequately regulate the more subtle government enticement at work in the political violence context. 
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GONZAGA LAW REVIEW IV. CONTROLLING CONSPIRACY Despite these risks, in the hands of wise and effective prosecutors, conspiracy charges can enhance public safety while respecting civil liberties. The legal system must encourage prosecutors to bring appropriate conspiracy cases while winnowing out cases that are ripe for abuse. This result requires a combination of internal, ethical, and judicial controls that enhance accountability and promote prosecutorial deliberation.
A-Internal and Ethical Criteria
Prosecutors should prioritize investigation of suspected terrorists with special indicia of risk. Criteria of this kind will minimize the use of precious law enforcement resources to pursue wannabes and big talkers. In addition, internal and ethical guidelines can require consideration of the opportunity costs of particular charging decisions.
Conspiracy investigations using informants and stings are appropriate when an individual has a pattern of appearances in reports of the illegal activities of others, under circumstances that strongly suggest advance knowledge or specific encouragement. In the pre-September 11 Abdel Rahman case, the government successfully prosecuted an extremist Brooklyn cleric known as the "blind Sheik." ' 237 Information available to the government suggested that Abdel Rahman had been a common thread in a group responsible for several high-profile acts of violence including the first World Trade Center bombing and the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane. 238 The jury convicted Abdel Rahman after hearing a tape of the Sheik specifically authorizing an informant to kill Egyptian President Mubarak during a visit by Mubarak to the United States. 239 The group's track record of violence reduced the risk of false positives that so often plagues conspiracy cases.
In a similar vein, ongoing illegality is an appropriate cue for law enforcement interest. If suspects are currently violating the law, they reveal the earnestness and commitment that characterize a successful conspiracy. In the Fort Dix case, the defendants, who were undocumented aliens, were seen firing guns in the nowinfamous DVD that formed the basis for the first tip to law enforcement. 40 Since undocumented aliens cannot lawfully possess guns under federal law, 241 this illegality was a sufficient basis for pushing forward with the investigation. [Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS A suspect should receive priority for further investigation when that suspect has special experience with the purported target of the attack. Experience increases the knowledge level of the suspect and the possibility of a successful plot. It also enhances the likelihood that the suspect has a grudge or other motivation that may impel the suspect toward consummation of the plot. Russell Defreitas, one of the defendants in the Kennedy Airport case, had long experience as an employee at JFK 242 Airport.
While his plot to blow up gas tanks was still farfetched, his experience could not be wholly discounted by law enforcement officials.
The difficult deliberative calculus required of prosecutors could also benefit from further internal and ethical guidance on the interaction of conspiracy charges and issues of nationality, ethnicity, and religion. Guidelines in the US Attorneys' Manual or elsewhere should require that prosecutors consider the long-term impact of investigative methods such as reliance on informers and sting operations, particularly in communities such as Arab or South-Asian neighborhoods often targeted for 243 terrorist investigations.
In addition, the ethical rules that prosecutors must follow should require greater selectivity and more gatekeeping in targeting particular communities. Currently, the rules of ethics provide only modest guidance for prosecutors. 244 While the comments to the Rules articulate a shining vision of the prosecutor as a "minister ofjustice, ' 245 the Rules themselves do little to realize this ideal. More specific rules and more concrete enforcement will ensure that responses to crisis are both measured and effective.
In sum, prosecutorial deliberation is not a recipe for doing nothing. Indeed, a deliberative approach requires law enforcement officials to move quickly when the situation warrants. However, a more proactive strategy should focus on the reasonable possibility of violence acts or substantial funding of violence, and should not target wannabes and penny ante players.
B. The Judicial Role
Courts also have a role to play as gatekeepers, making up for the lack of deliberation displayed by prosecutors. As always, a robust judicial role may clash 
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First, the courts should return to the wisdom of earlier conspiracy cases like
246
Kotteakos, by requiring congruency between the scope of alleged agreements and the scope required under section 956. In the hub and spoke cases, the courts achieved this congruency by limiting the generality that the government could impute to specific transactions. When a defendant in one of the spokes agreed to engage in conduct with the goal of defrauding the government in a particular transaction, the courts limited the scope of agreement to that transaction. Courts refused to impute to this defendant each of the individual frauds generated by the many other spokes. Comparable specificity would promote fairness in the context of section 956. A section 956 defendant like Padilla has allegedly committed what we can call an affiliative crime. His act was affiliative because it reflected solidarity with the general aims of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. As noted above, attendance at a camp is closely related to manifestations of solidarity that would clearly constitute 247 protected speech, such as marching in a demonstration supporting Al Qaeda. Some of the behavior at the camp, include chanting and posing for videos, is indistinguishable from such protected expressions of affiliation. The discrete act of applying to attend or even attending a terrorist training camp does not fit the broader agreement to commit violent acts that supports section 956 liability.
248
Most importantly, attendance at a training camp is not a fungible good, comparable to the provision of funding or equipment. Once provided, money or equipment may be used by a terrorist group for any purpose. However, a person attending a training camp is not fungible in this sense. The individual must be trained, and has the opportunity to desert, defect, or become disaffected at any point. 249 Even the specific intent to participate in terrorist acts at some future date, once training is complete, cannot obviate these contingencies, which are inherent in Lack of fungibility should not bar a section 956 prosecution of an alleged recruiter of terrorist trainees, since over time the sheer numbers of recruits will overcome contingencies in particular cases. Moreover, an effective recruiter's job consists of winnowing out individuals who may become ambivalent, exhausted, or disillusioned. Anyone who conspires to recruit two or more camp attendees would be culpable on this view of section 956.
[Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS the human condition.
25 0 In this sense, applying to or even attending a terrorist training camp possesses an element of uncertainty distinct from the character of the conduct that could be properly charged under section 956. 251 Beyond policing the scope of agreements punishable under section 956, courts should also be more robust in their gatekeeping function, making up for failures. In cases dealing with material support to designated terrorist groups such as Hamas, courts have struck down as vague or otherwise impermissible certain' portions of the statutes. For example, courts have ruled that the use of the terms "training," "personnel," and "expert advice or assistance" encompass too much activity that the First Amendment protects, such as training a group in international law or nonviolent techniques. 252 According to courts, these terms provide insufficient guidance for individuals to discern the boundary between protected and prohibited acts, and therefore chill protected speech.
253
Another important judicial innovation would require an emphasis in instructions to juries on the materiality of defendant's overt acts. In conspiracy cases, for example, the law could require not merely an act in furtherance of the conspiracy that might be casual or inadvertent, but an act that materially advances the goals of the conspiracy-that makes it more likely that the goals will be achieved. On this view, an alleged conspirator in a plot to blow up a subway station would commit a material overt act by purchasing ingredients such as fertilizer or dynamite that are needed for explosives. Other acts less proximate in time, such as a plane hijacker's taking plane trips with no other purpose than casing the airline's systems, could also be material overt acts. However, acts with a more ambiguous interpretation, such as the assembly of diagrams of a site from generic online sources, would not be sufficient 
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An additional step might be the reform of the entrapment defense. Right now, the defense does not curb unnecessary sting operations, since the government can almost always show the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Courts should replace this subjective test with an objective test more focused on the government's conduct. Judges should instruct the jury that if the jury finds that a government agent or informant was the primary player behind the agreement, the jury should acquit the defendant. This change in entrapment doctrine would revive the defense, and make it useful in curbing overreaching or manufactured plots by the government. However, the defense would still permit a conviction when the defendant had a track record or pattern of acts demonstrating knowing and voluntary participation, thereby requiring less pushing on the part of the agent of the informant. In the Abdel Rahman case, for example, the blind sheik needed very little prompting to discuss in vivid terms the duty to assassinate President Mubarak of Egypt. The post-September 11 preventive paradigm ushered in an old dilemma: conspiracy's fragile balance between false positives and false negatives. Addressing the risk of political violence through conspiracy charges poses special risks, as history has revealed from Sir Walter Raleigh to the Chicago Seven trial. Unfortunately, the administration's policymakers-always impatient with a historical narrative that they did not initiate-ignored these risks. After September 11, conspiracy prosecutions laundered shadow government machinations such as extralegal detention and interrogation. The preventive paradigm thrived on hype, prioritizing stale cases and terrorist wannabes. In the process, prosecutors too often let informants' agendas supplant prosecutorial judgment, and finessed obligations such as the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence and refrain from prejudicial pretrial publicity. The government's broad interpretation of liability under section 956 in cases such as the prosecution of Jose Padilla accentuates conspiracy's perennial dilemma. By charging Padilla with conspiracy to murder, maim, and kidnap abroad by virtue of his application to attend a terrorist training camp, the government attributed plots and 256. Because prosecutors must care about both false positives and false negatives, their job is extraordinarily difficult In contrast, terrorists do not care about false positives. They construct elaborate justifications to explain that all victims are complicit. The difficulty of the prosecutor's job is another measure of its importance in a democracy. See Green, supra note 244, at 1576-78.
[Vol. 43:3 CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS plans to Padilla that far exceeded the narrow scope of his alleged agreement. Padilla's conviction was surely expedient in light of the government's earlier assertions, and it was never mentioned at trial that Padilla had sought a "dirty bomb." However, the expedience of the conviction only heightens the risk that the government will use section 956 conspiracy to target people because of who they are, or whom the government fears them to be. As Robert Jackson warned during an earlier time of crisis, that temptation is a central threat to the rule of law.
257
Prosecutors should reject this temptation while preserving conspiracy's virtues as a legitimate weapon against terrorists. Where suspects have prior knowledge of attacks and appear to be a common strand in a web of wrongdoing, as in the case of Sheik Abdel Rahman, the use of stings and informers is appropriate. This is also true where the suspects are already engaging in illegal conduct, as in the undocumented aliens taking target practice in the Fort Dix case, or have special knowledge or experience, as in the JFK arrests. The best prosecutors will use this powerful weapon when necessary, after deliberation about the always elusive balance between false positives and false negatives. To aid in this deliberation, ethics rules and Justice Department policy should require more deliberation about both the short-and longterm costs of conspiracy prosecutions to cooperation from targeted communities of Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians.
Courts play a necessary role as gatekeepers when prosecutors fail. In a case like Padilla's, courts should require congruency between the scope of the defendant's alleged agreement and the aim of murder, mayhem, or kidnapping required under section 956. Actual or attempted participation at a training camp abroad should be punishable not under section 956, but merely as lending material support to terrorist activity.
In addition, courts should make the overt act requirement more robust, to ensure that a conspiracy amounts to more than a wannabe's wishlist. Courts should also refine the entrapment defense, instructing a jury to acquit when a government informer is the prime mover behind the alleged plot.
Responsible prosecutors recognize that the wrongful conviction of an innocent person ultimately aids the terrorist cause. Terrorists wager that responses to threats will produce a crisis of legitimacy within democratic governments. Overreliance on conspiracy charges has generated such crises in the past, as the responses to labor and leftist agitation demonstrate. The post-September 11 preventive paradigm has written another chapter in this sad history. While criticism has focused on Guantanamo, the abuses of conspiracy law may ultimately have an even greater impact. This essay is a modest step towards identifying the challenges for prudent and effective prosecutors, and implementing appropriate reforms. 
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